In 2005, the directors of the Institute of Terrorism Research and Response (ITRR) were asked to set up a network for clients that we work with. By monitoring adversarial websites, chat rooms, blogs, and additional resources, the analysts and researchers were able to notify our clients in advance on potential adversarial threats and attacks against them or interests of the client.

Through its Targeted Actionable Monitoring Center (TAM-C), ITRR has been monitoring and analyzing resources in various languages. This Center is based both in Israel and the United States and is staffed by researchers and intelligence analysts with backgrounds in multiple languages, intelligence, and research and analysis.

Just a small amount of information that was identified and warned in advance dealt with attacks to fuel pipelines in Africa, Jewish and Israeli assets internationally, violence at the opening of the World Cup, and the connection between the India train attacks and Al-Qaeda.

The above information was confirmed with the international network the TAM-C has established and the information is collected and analyzed.
Today's security manager is inundated with information that has happened in the past – too late to react to these events. ITRR's researchers and analysts receive and analyze information from throughout the world, analyze it in the context of the client's needs, and provide information on what will happen in the context of the needs of the specific client.

• Law enforcement and security personnel should increase awareness in assets that have already been targeted internationally.
  
• Understand tactics employed in other sites by the adversary.
  
• Review of information collection and analysis.
  
• Increase of awareness for preoperational surveillance by adversarial cells.

As large American companies move to off shore locations, travel between global points has become a growing characteristic of the American business. With the greater exposure of American companies internationally, there is an increased vulnerability to terrorist and criminal gang attacks.

To deal with those vulnerabilities, the Institute of Terrorism Research and Response provides businesses with the following information:

• Terrorist threat information particularly directed towards the client
  
• Targeting of hotels used by the client in the various countries
  
• Targeting of Westerners

• Pre-operational indicators such as surveillance, presence of known terrorists in country, etc.
  
• Anti-government protest activity – locations, times & dates, etc.
  
• Crime patterns and trends that serve to put a company’s personnel at risk
  
• The risk of using certain motor routes for inbound and outbound personnel
  
• The risk of known terror operatives operating in the area and the subsequent risk of an act of terror occurring there.

We use the following assets to provide security advice for the agreed upon countries:
1. Review of indigenous media in all countries (for which ITRR is contracted) to spot crime trends, anti-western propaganda, etc.
2. Daily review of Arab language bulletin boards, forums, and training web sites to spot terrorist tactics, training, and procedures (TTP) that are currently being distributed to anti-western groups.
3. Daily scans of Arab language websites focusing on word groups indicating threats against our client’s industry.
4. The names of the countries agreed upon and contracted for will be considered “key words” in the scan of Arab language websites, bulletin boards, and forums.
5. A compilation and analysis of “closed source” information. The analysis of such resources will be weighed against the information gathered by Institute of Terrorism Research and Response’s sources.
6. The use of resources provided by both U.S. and foreign services.

In order to identify vulnerabilities within the private and public sectors, managers can be assisted by tools that will monitor the behavior and intentions of the adversary. By identifying the intentions of the adversary, security resources of the asset can be maximized and lives and properties prepared for potential threats.

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A special report reprinted from FrontLine-Canada Online Nov/Dec 2005

By Professor Joe Varner

Al-Qaeda has long had a fascination with maritime targets and has a history of going after these interests with only limited success. Its interest in maritime adventures is no secret and warnings abound. For example, on 3 August 2003, Tom Ridge, then U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, warned that terrorists might strike at ferries. One year later, Britain’s First Sea Lord, Admiral Sir Alan West claimed to have intell that Al Qaeda was planning to attack Western maritime interests including naval forces. Admiral West also warned that prime targets included port and naval chokepoints such as the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar.

Observers believe that you can tell a great deal about Al-Qaeda’s future plans and intentions from their past deeds, both successful and the failures.

But it appears that as much as Al-Qaeda would like to carry out a spectacular maritime even, so far its successes have been limited. Al Qaeda has not lived up to its hallmark standard of spectacular event, high degree of coordination, and accompanying high body count. Al-Qaeda’s only real maritime successes, limited as they are, have been their strikes on the USS Cole, the French Tanker Limburg and attacks by their affiliates on two Philippine passenger ferries:

• October 2000: Two Al Qaeda attackers rammed a small boat loaded with
explosives into the side of the USS Cole in the Port of Aden. Sadly, 17 sailors were killed and 40 civilians were injured in the attack, an event celebrated by Osama bin Laden.
• October 2002: The French oil tanker Limburg was attacked in Yemen’s coastal waters when it was apparently rammed by a small craft carrying TNT. The explosion killed one crewman and spilled 90,000 barrels of oil into the Gulf of Aden.
• January 2004: A bomb was exploded on a Philippines ferry, Superferry 14, in
Manila Bay killing 116 people. The Al-Qaeda-linked Philippines terror group Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for the attack.
• August 2005: The Al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the Philippines bombed a ferry, the Dona Ramona, at Lamitan on the island of Basilan. Some 30 people were injured
when the device exploded near gas containers in the ship’s canteen.

All of these attacks involved either placing a small craft loaded with explosives next to a vessel or placing a bomb on board the vessel. While Al-Qaeda’s tactical successes have been limited, they have had several notable failures:

• January 2002: It was reported that Singaporean authorities had busted a 13-member Al Qaeda-linked Jemaah Islamiyah cell that had plotted to attack American air and naval forces in that
Southeast Asian nation. One plan was centred on an attack against naval personnel
riding on a bus ashore, while another was to bomb U.S. naval vessels Northeast of Singapore around Changi and Palau Tekong.

• June 2002: Moroccan authorities arrested three Saudi nationals believed linked to Al-Qaeda who were reportedly plotting to attack British and American naval forces in the Straits of The Gibraltar with dingies loaded with explosives around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla.

• October 2004: U.S. authorities warned that groups of men, thought to be “Middle Eastern,” had videotaped the inside of some of the Washington State ferries. Some 19 incidents were
considered at the time to be “highly likely” or “extremely likely” to have been terrorist surveillance operations.

• August 2005: Turkish authorities busted a reported Syrian-led Al-Qaeda plot to ram explosive laden speed boats into Israeli cruise ships in international waters as they sailed to visit
Turkey. Five Israeli cruise ships were diverted to Cyprus along with their five thousand passengers to avoid attack.

• August 2005: Al Qaeda reportedly fired timer-controlled Katyusha rockets at the USS Ashland and USS Kearsage. The U.S. warships were docked at the Red Sea Jordanian Port of
Aqaba. One Jordanian soldier was killed in the attack but the ships and their crews were unharmed.

These failed Al-Qaeda plots again concentrated on the tactic of ramming a small craft loaded with explosives into a vessel or placing a bomb inside the ship. The closest Al-Qaeda has come to its “spectacular event” has been the failed Katyusha attack on two U.S. warships in Jordan.

Thus far, Al-Qaeda has not sought to attack a major port facility, but that lapse seems to have come to an end, marked by the failed Jordanian venture in August. Al Qaeda also has witnessed
the example set by Palestinian terrorists. Consider the 14 March 2004, joint Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade-Hamas suicide bomber attack on the Israeli Port of Ashdod, where two bombers apparently exited shipping containers to attack the Israeli facility. One bomber detonated himself near the chemical storage area of the busy Mediterranean port – either by accident or more seriously by design – possibly hoping to create a massive toxic chemical cloud in the area.

Additionally, there have been several news reports about how U.S. Homeland Security officials are deeply concerned about the prospect of a merchant ship carrying a weapon of mass
destruction into a port adjacent to a major city. Former U.S. Counter Terrorism Coordinator,

Richard Clarke, and the U.S. Intelligence community had come to a similar dark assessment of
the potential for an Al-aeda attack on a port city using a Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) tanker. For instance, a Sandia National Laboratories study has warned that a terrorist attack on
an LNG tanker passing Boston Harbor could be catastrophic. The study determined that an LNG spill from a 16-foot hole blasted in the side of the tanker’s hull, if ignited, would create a thermal blast that would set buildings on fire and melt steel out to 1,281 feet and give people second-degree burns up to 4,282 feet away.

Thus, when Al -aeda ends its fascination with attacking ships in or near to port, it is almost certain to turn its attention to the port facilities themselves, a prized economic target. This threat of spectacular maritime attack on a port facility should cause most G-8 countries like Canada to give pause. Canada has ranked fifth on the so-called Al Qaeda list of enemies
to kill and is the only country yet to face a major Al Qaeda strike.

Canada’s ports are far too open and vulnerable to organized crime and terrorist attack. On 6 December 1917, history was made when two ships collided by accident in wartime Halifax Harbour and created the largest man-made explosion at that time. Some 1,900 people were
killed and another 4,000 injured; 1,630 homes were destroyed; 12,000 damaged; and 6,000 people were left without shelter. It was an accident of navigation, not an intentional act of terror, but it is likely that this historical event has caught some Al-Qaeda planner’s attention.
In a post-September 11th world, Canada, like all G8 nations, could face an attack that would dwarf the Halifax Explosion.

It’s true that warships, luxury cruise ships, passenger ferries and super tankers have been the targets of the past, a major port appears to be the prized Al-Qaeda target of the future. Taking such a threat seriously and preparing for worst-case scenarios could mitigate the effects of an attack, if not thwart such plans.

Joe Varner is Assistant Professor and Program Manager for Homeland Security at American Military University

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AMU has recently posted a great site with audio, video and presentations from their homeland security symposium, The Ripple Effect.

Check it out - www.apus.edu/disaster/presentations

It's in Flash, so you'll need to have the Adobe Flash player to view. If you don't have it, you can download it here.

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By Elena Siddall

Through experience with a number of churches, schools, and community groups, I’ve found that the most effective way to engage a targeted population is face to face.

My colleague, Alvina Bey Bennett-a public health nurse, and I collaborated to form We Prepare America, an organization that focuses on the citizen and the impact of a disaster on the individual and the community. We used FEMA material and have designed workshops to be highly adaptive to time constraints, but to convey at the very least, the need to:

1) have an emergency kit
2) have appropriate fundamental information as to actions related to hazards
3) have a family plan of post event location and actions of family members

We have trademarked KIP™, the acronym of the most basic elements of the universally accepted Emergency Preparedness Plan.

While we recognize the fact that we cannot educate each individual person, we can begin with groups. This is the ripple effect- from the bottom up. The prepared individual is an asset to the community; conversely, the unprepared citizen is a burden on the already strained Emergency Management System’s human, material and financial resources. The unprepared citizen is the weakest link in the chain, thus compromising the whole system.

The prepared citizen is a community resource.

And should be viewed as such by local officials, elected and appointed. In practice, this is an embraced philosophy-once prepared individually and within one’s the family, individual efforts can be extended to volunteer beyond, but need to be actually welcomed by the authorities.

Our personal experience has shown that many volunteers are trained, but not utilized.

The two recent tragic events, of the terrorist attack of 9/11 and Katrina, a natural disaster of Biblical proportions, have launched series of Congressional hearings, intense attention from the media and attempts to identify “Lessons Learned”.

Billions of tax dollars, as well as donations from the private sector have, to date, resulted in few meaningful actions, (except from the religious and non-profit community, providing the bulk of comfort care).

A large percentage of the population remains woefully unprepared. The two mentioned events underscore the fact that the government cannot protect everyone, everywhere. The citizen must understand that in a disaster, one is on his own, until help arrives. Calling 911 may be futile. This comes as a shock to most individuals.

Research

Research, mostly via surveys in the field of Emergency Management is considerable and unfortunately repetitive. A great deal of the published material deals with methodology of the studies. A wealth of information is related to examining the barriers of citizen decision to prepare with KIP Folks simply have not taken the recommended steps because of:

1) lack of importance that individuals place on preparedness
2) lack of time
3) lack of information

Simply addressing the last factor is ineffective unless the information is given in connection to convincing citizens that the process is very important and easy.

The best motivator for taking action is the perception of imminent threat. We all know the phenomenon of the storming of the grocery stores if a storm is expected. KIP™ is very much like insurance. It is too late to remember the lapsed insurance premium as the barn is on fire. It is too late to begin searching for the flash-light when the power goes out. It may not prevent the disaster, but being prepared to survive the disaster may go a long way to reduce panic, and save lives.

The Emergency Kit

In giving instruction for an emergency kit, a checklist is the best received method, taking into consideration individual needs, individual preferences geographic location, season of the year. Depending on economic factors, a kit can be created at one time or added to over a period of time, the former being preferable. Water, power snacks, flash-light and battery operated radios medicines and first aid are standard items for the 3-day kit. A visual demonstration, with a brief explanation for the inclusion of each item of the contents is helpful –and reinforces the simplicity and ease of the process.

Information

Information is better received if provided by local sources that are known and trusted, such as first responders. While most citizens depend on TV for emergency information, a battery operated radio is the crucial source of information in case of power outage.

The public must be educated to understand the common vocabulary of Emergency Management. The very useful (if universally understood) color-coded Homeland Security Advisory System is the quickest way to inform the public of the level of danger. Established in March 2002, it is a tool used to describe threat conditions for a possible terrorist attack.

Hurricanes are characterized by number to indicate severity of expected danger. CDC has recently adopted a numerical system in categorizing pandemic threat. The government site for public information is Ready.gov (add hyperlink www.ready.gov) The site has undergone numerous improvements; however remains an unknown source to the majority of individuals.

Plan
Does every family member know where to re-group after the disastrous event? Does every member have emergency contact information? Are all crucial documents in a safe, accessible place?

The three-pronged Emergency Preparedness Plan is understandable and based on common sense. It does not require having high skills. and is based on common sense.

In general, people trust experts over officials. The 2002 Robert Wood Johnson Study found that the public would seek information in case of a bioterrorist attack from a doctor (74%), local hospital (65%), the local Red Cross (55%) and the local health department (51%). Only 25% would trust the media. 37% would trust the head of the DHS.

Events of Katrina tarnished the image and trust that the public has in the government’s ability to respond to a disaster.

However numerous post-Katrina studies indicate no increase in the level of citizen preparedness. Several studies have been singled out for their significance because they are based on pre and post Katrina studies.

• National Center for Disaster Preparedness- Columbia University Mailman School of Public Health conducted an annual survey in July 2005 –Where American Public Stands on Terrorism and Preparedness Four Years after September 11. A follow-up study was conducted in October 2005. One crucial finding was that the percentage of family emergency plan having the three components (KIP) increased by only 1 percentage point.

• Center for Excellence in Government/American Red Cross- developed a Public Readiness Index

• Macro International Inc (ORC Macro)- conducted a survey in 2003 and mid-October 2005 to measure citizens levels of perceived and actual preparedness, reasons for and barriers to preparedness.

• Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response- New York University. The survey of basic preparedness or lack of and measured confidence in state, local and Federal government and selected non-profits organizations. The post Katrina findings revealed that non-profit organizations did not suffer the loss of trust as did governmental agencies.

• National Organization on Disability.

• Katrina Evacuee Survey –Washington Post, Kaiser Foundation and Harvard University cast light on levels on preparedness on “vulnerable populations” and in the case of the Evacuees survey, examined perceived threat of Katrina and readiness and willingness to evacuate.
  

A significant observation made by Macro Inc. is that very few studies investigated citizens’ reliance on organizations such as their schools, workplace, and local faith-based or community-based organizations. Only the 2003 American Red Cross study examined this area, indicating a hopeful sign that 45% of parents received disaster information from their child’s school and that 55% received formal information or training from their employers.

In our research, we found the most interesting and relevant study to be REDEFINING READINESS: Terrorism Planning Through the Eyes of the Public. In September 2004, the Center for the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health, of The New York Academy of Medicine released a study report titled REDEFINING READINESS. Funding came from the W. K. Kellogg Foundation, to ask questions about plans developed by the government in the wake of 9/11.

Billions of dollars to strengthen the capacity of government agencies and private-sector organizations at local, state and Federal levels to respond to terrorist attacks and other emergencies have been invested.

• Are we getting as much as can be expected from the investment?
  
• Will the plans that are being developed work as expected?
  
• Will they protect as many citizens as possible?

  Good questions. And the short answer is NO. The initial research results were that the most valuable resource was described as “the common-sense knowledge of American people and their strong interest in contributing that knowledge to community and organizational preparedness planning”. The RR study documents that terrorism response plans developed without public input, place millions of citizens unnecessarily at risk.

  The Center embarked on an 18 month- long study of four communities across the country to demonstrate how terrorism/emergency response plans can be improved. These local demonstration projects can serve as national models.

  The communities, representing diverse urban, suburban and rural selected (by competition) are:
  

  • The City of Carlsbad and South Eddy County, New Mexico
    
  • Humboldt Park section in Chicago, Illinois
    
  • Eastside neighborhood in Savannah, Georgia
    
  • Choctaw, McCurtain and Pushmatah Counties in Oklahoma
    
  
  The study ended January 31, 2007. We are looking forward to reading the results.

  About the Authors

  Together, Elena Siddall and Alvina Bey-Bennett have more than 70 years experience in child welfare, medical social work, public health, as well as work in the non-profit sector as workers and volunteers, locally, nationally and internationally.

  Last month, Siddall and Bennett presented at AMU’s Homeland Security Symposium – The Ripple Effect at the National Press Club.

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Reports of substandard conditions at Walter Reed Army Medical Center made its way to the Nation a couple of weeks ago. In the wake of the scandal, a few have stepped down and admitted fault. But is that enough?

What are your thoughts about our soldiers taking refuge in a space filled with moldy plaster and mice?

Click the "Comments" link to weigh in.

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