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In a new lead commentary, Ken Ballen reports on Terror Free Tomorrow’s latest findings and their policy implications: “Those who think that Muslim countries and pro-terrorist attitudes go hand-in-hand might be shocked by new polling research: Americans are more approving of terrorist attacks against civilians than any major Muslim country except for Nigeria.” Read the complete op-ed.
By Aaron Richman
Co-Director
The Institute of Terrorism Research and Response
The tragic school shootings caused American law enforcement to adopt a new philosophy - moving from a SWAT-based model to a patrol unit-based model for the handling of dynamic situations (the SWAT-based model being preferred for stationary situations). However, we issue a call to law enforcement professionals to institute a new training model for their uniform patrol units. Similar to the constant training of SWAT officers and their commanders, uniform patrol units and their command personnel must frequently practice and be tested through realistic training exercises to perform as a cohesive unit.
The increase in school and campus violence calls for an assessment of current emergency response practices (lockdown, emergency notification and communication, and active shooter tactics). The constant assessing of the response plans should include the testing and re-testing of the plan through exercise cycles that include workshops, tabletop, functional and full scale exercises.
The Israeli model for preparing to respond to major incidents includes extensive hands on training. Training scenarios, whether table-top or real-life, are drilled at the level of the lone patrol officer up to the level of an entire unit. Furthermore, commanding officers are drilled by their supervisors along with their subordinates.
The benefits of such an approach are abundant: the commander can improve at a personal level, as well as learn to better identify training points to focus on among his personnel. Just as the commanding officer needs to be at the scene of an actual terrorist attack as soon as possible, actively managing the incident, he also needs to be an integral part of the training and drilling for such an event.
As a uniform patrol commander or someone in a supervisory position, it is imperative to ensure that your personnel are properly trained and practiced to respond to active shooting scenarios¬ -to minimize operational complications, misunderstandings, lack of communications, or injury to civilians and emergency personnel, as well as to maximize response efforts.
In order to respond appropriately to such an incident, American law enforcement and emergency services need to train and conduct field exercises in conjunction with other relevant agencies. Such regular training sessions can assist in preparing for such a response and ease the coordination and collaboration of the responding agencies.
Law enforcement must train for all levels of the response. Our experience has taught us the need to train and respond as if there is a secondary device targeting the first responders, or diversionary tactics to target alternate sites. Different response scenarios should be addressed both at the policy and procedure stages as well as "going out" and testing the plan.
The successful response to such an incident is dependent upon the pre-planning between all of the relevant agencies at all the levels of the command.
The fast paced dissemination of information to the other security agencies assisting in the interdiction of the threat. Regular inter-agency training, with open dialogue and cooperation between all responding agencies. Training and cooperating with private security forces at assets that may or have been adversarial targets.
At the time of any high-profile event, the commander on "watch" needs to be trained to properly make fast strategic and tactical decisions, based on the needs of the district, the specific event, and the units available at any given moment. When tactical decisions are made in an instantaneous fashion, immediate goals are met and the system operates efficiently, with minimal losses and a quick return to normalcy for the citizens.
With an increase in soft target attacks globally, law enforcement officials are presented with new and unique challenges. The Israel experience teaches us that there are many steps to maximize success and minimize casualties. Chief among them is training, by all levels of command, for preventing mass-casualty attacks before they occur and for handling the situation if they do.
Law enforcement needs to understand the changing reality; the patrol officer on the street may be responsible for violent interdiction, whether criminal or terror related. This requires agency policies and procedures that will guide responding officers at the incident. Communications between commanders and pre-planned responses expedite the response and speed the initiation of specific tactics for interdiction. Experience has taught us that this is only achieved through constant exercising of the plans and all of the personnel.
Check out AMU program manager Bob Jaffin's two part article about increased opportunities in the homeland security job market.
Homeland Security Careers: More Opportunities Than Ever Before
from the Institute of Terrorism Research and Response
On Monday, 17 April 2006, a suicide bomber detonated a large explosive at a Tel Aviv fast food stand in the vicinity of the Old Central Bus Station killing 9 and wounding approximately 50civilians. The Islamic Jihad terror group and the Al Aksa Brigades, affiliated with Fatah, have claimed responsibility for the attack. The bomber attempted to gain entry into the restaurant; however, was challenged and was prevented entry by a security guard posted at the entrance.
Prior to Monday afternoon’s attack in Tel Aviv, Israel's intelligence agencies were reporting 19 specific intelligence reports of planned terrorist attacks, and another eighty more general threats.
According to latest reports, the driver of a suspicious vehicle, allegedly involved in transporting the bomber to his destination, has been apprehended by security forces at a checkpoint on Jerusalem-Tel Aviv Highway, near Ramallah.
An Overview and Lessons Learned Suicide Bombing
Old Central Bus Station
Tel Aviv, Israel
Thursday, 19 January 2006
Infrastructure background:
On the date Thursday January 19, 2006 at 1540 hours a suicide bomber walked into the Mayor Shwarma Restaurant situated in the busy and congested Old Central Bus Center in the Southern part of the City of Tel Aviv. This most recent bombing, offers learning points with regards to the operational tempo and adversarial tactics of the terrorist organization.
On this date 32 civilians were injured with the casualties coming from both outside and inside of the restaurant where the bomber detonated himself. Of the 32 casualties, approximately half were in the restaurant, leaving the remaining casualties to have been bystanders passing the restaurant.
The political background to this most recent bombing comes at a time when the Palestinian Authority as well as the Hamas is taking part in local elections on January 22, 2006. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the deadliest of organizations over the last few months in Israel, has decided to boycott any elections. Israeli intelligence agencies have identified this declaration by the Islamic Jihad, as a call to arms and a call to escalate violence within Israel.
Based on security forces terror log for the date, there were 53 general alerts 10 specific alerts and no specific intelligence on the target location.
Another point for consideration is the Terror Triangle identified by the Israel Minister of Defense, Shaul Mofaz. The terror triangle is the means for planning and executing terror attacks within the State of Israel by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It has been identified to the fact that the Iranian Government has been funding the attacks, while the Syrian headquarters of the Islamic Jihad in conjunction with Syrian Government agencies, has taken the role of planning the specific Iranian funded attack. Execution of the plan is done by the PIJ.
The site:
The older of two main bus stations in the city of Tel Aviv, this bus station was for years the main thoroughfare for internal public transportation throughout the country, until the newer transportation center was built two blocks away. This central bus station is built in an open environment spanning on approximately 6 square blocks with almost unlimited access points for pedestrians and vehicles. In that this bus station spans approximately a 6 block radius, access by foot and vehicles is easy and can pose a major threat when the adversary targets this location.
The new transportation center, a closed structure, is built with minimal access points, all of which controlled by highly trained and armed private security and under the supervision of the Tel Aviv police precinct. A similar transportation venue was built in Jerusalem in recent years as well, whereby; security forces are able to control in an “enclosed” environment access to the site both by foot and vehicle.
The old central bus station sits among outdoor vendors, home appliance stores, butchers, and a sundry of food stands. The population that tends to migrate to the old central bus station is the local businesses, the homeless population and many foreign workers. It is a preferred location of the local businesses and nearby employees to go for a fast meal, as well as a place to relax at the end of the week, prior to the Jewish Sabbath. In that it is an area quite congested with the traffic both of the new transportation center, the old central bus station, and the local population running errands or eating on location, there is a unique presence of “door to door” vendors that are selling to the passersby anything that they can carry on their back or hang on their shoulder. This may include small tools, religious gifts, perfumes, or even dollar exchange.
Past attacks:
For a number of reasons, of which this article will address, the old central bus station has been a “preferred” site for past suicide attacks. On January 2002, 32 Israelis were injured, three of which seriously, when a SB detonated himself on the main pedestrian walkway of the old central bus station, Neve Sha’anan. This was followed by a deadlier attack on July 2002. On this date, two suicide bombers detonated themselves at the popular local Coffee House, “Mercaz HaGarinim”, situated in the center of the old central bus station. A total of five fatalities and dozens were injured, of which many foreign workers. The attacks progressively became more and more sophisticated, and during the month of January 2003 two simultaneous attacks targeted this site. On this date, one suicide bomber ambushes a large group of pedestrians that are waiting at one of the larger bus stops within the station. With emergency personnel en route and approximately a minute following the first attack, the second bomber detonates himself on the main pedestrian walkway, Neveh Sha’anan. In this attack, a total of 23 killed, and hundreds were injured.
Incident Eyewitness accounts:
The attack
As per the Tel Aviv Police Department, the bomber, Sami Abed El-Hafir Anter, 19, a member of the PIJ and a resident of the Palestinian city of Nablus had arrived that day to execute the attack. Anter was a physical education student studying for his bachelor’s degree at Anjach University in his hometown. He carried with him a relatively small device that was in his backpack that he carried on his shoulder. Even though there were a large amount of casualties (32 total), the device was only partially detonated which caused great danger in the rescue efforts by Israel Emergency Medical Services (MDA).
The suicide bomber and the cell that dispatched him to the location had strategically chosen the site, the date, and time for this attack. The time and day of the week that the attack was perpetrated was Thursday at 1540 hours. For natives that live and work in the vicinity of the Old Central bus station, this is an ideal time to maximize the casualties by guaranteeing a large amount of people in the vicinity. The end of the week is the period when soldiers are returning home from their bases, employees are leaving work for the start of the weekend (Friday and Saturday), and local residents are shopping for the upcoming Sabbath.
This soft target is right next to a secure and hardened transportation venue. It in essence has zero access control. This is compounded by the fact that the population that shops and crosses this arena, includes both foreign workers, Israelis, and Palestinians returning home to the Palestinian Authority. These factors only contribute to the ability of a terror cell to operate in such an environment in order to do preoperational surveillance, target selection, and even recruitment of Palestinian employees that work in the vicinity.
The adversary had prior knowledge of site and had done some level of preoperational surveillance of this target either specifically for this attack or earlier attacks at the same location. In addition, the bomber had dressed and acted appropriately for the scene. This included dressing like an outdoor vendor; selling items to the pedestrians crossing his path (see eyewitness accounts). Based off of eye witness accounts, at least the bomber himself had been in the vicinity of his target for some period of time prior to the attack. The reasoning behind this may be numerous; however, one can imagine that the cell was awaiting the right amount of people inside the target before the bomber hit his target. The cover that the bomber was given was extremely effective in not arousing suspicion, enabling him to maximize his presence in the vicinity. No knowledge of handler presence or other parts of the PIJ cell.
Lessons Learned
From this attack, security personnel and law enforcement can understand the operational factors of the adversary. Some points for consideration in your planning, training, and exercising procedures:
Summary:
In order to respond appropriately to such an incident, law enforcement and emergency services needs to train and conduct field exercises in conjunction with the relevant agencies, as well as covert and overt officers. Such training sessions can assist in preparing for such a response and ease the coordination and collaboration of the responding agencies. The attack can be thwarted at various levels during the planning process. It is preferred, for obvious reasons, to interdict at the adversarial preoperational surveillance phase as opposed to the dispatch of the bomber. Emergency managers must train for all levels of the response and need to respond as if there is a secondary device targeting the first responders. Different response scenarios should be addressed both at the policy and procedure stages as well as “going out” and testing the plan.
A special report reprinted from FrontLine Security Spring 2007
By Professor Joe Varner
The protection of critical infrastructure is a key national security issue in a way that it has not been since the ‘snakes and ladders’ days of the late 1950s and the early Cold War civil defence program. Today’s threat has changed from Soviet rockets to various state and non-state actors armed with an equally wide variety of weapons. With this revolution in military affairs, has come a renewed interest in asymmetric confrontation of the Superpower and its NATO and Western Allies. The target is the very institutions and systems that maintain our way of life and/or our cutting edge in military defence. It is the engine of our economy. Get at our critical infrastructure and strangle our economy. That is the goal of our opponents in the Global War on Terror.
What is Critical Infrastructure?
The Clinton administration seemed the first to recognize the danger to critical infrastructure posed by Al Qaeda and other terrorists of the world. With America’s virtual global military supremacy, US concerns shifted towards the threat to (and vulnerability of) the infrastructure that provides and supports that supremacy.
“Rogue states,” and sub-groups such as the ‘new terrorists,’ understood the reality that they could not defeat the U.S. militarily on the battlefield – they would thus take on ‘Goliath’ through asymmetric attacks on its economy and critical infrastructure. U.S. economic and military power are interdependent. The U.S. had already seen the impact of the Oklahoma City bombing of the federal building and knew that it was not immune to such attacks at home by terrorists. In the aftermath of the 1996 terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia on the U.S. military barracks at Khobar towers and the 1998 simultaneous bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directives PDD-62 and PDD-63 entitled “Protecting America’s Critical Infrastructure.” PDD-63 defined American Critical infrastructure as: “Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both governmental and private.“
Following the United States’ lead Canada’s Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada defined critical infrastructure as:
“Those physical and information technology facilities, networks, services and assets which, if disrupted or destroyed, would have a serious impact on the health, safety, security or economic wellbeing of Canadians or the effective functioning of governments in Canada.” The Canadian definition of ‘critical infrastructure’ is even broader than our American counter-part’s.
According to the Department of Public Safety, it includes ten sectors and is comprised of:
Such expanded definitions clearly acknowledge that the world of critical infrastructure is indeed a target-rich environment.
What is the Nature of the Threat?
Potential targets in the U.S. include some 600,000 bridges; 170,000 water systems; 2,800 power plants (104 of them nuclear); 305,775 kilometres (190,000 miles) of natural gas pipelines; 75,000 dams; and 463 skyscrapers that are 150 metres (500ft) or taller. The threat against critical infrastructure today is as broad as the potential target list itself. Potential attackers have every weapon at their disposal – from conventional explosives to more sophisticated arms.
Some have access to what are now defined as weapons of mass destruction such as Chemical, Biological, and Radiological weapons*. Still others have cyber weapons. The most common threat comes from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) using conventional explosives. Recent anti-terrorism seizures of ammonium nitrate fertilizer have exposed the ease with which terrorists can obtaincheap, conventional explosives. Considered to be the world’s most powerful plastic explosive and a favorite for terrorists, Semtex has continued to be popular with Hezbollah and Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has obtained common materials and chemicals from ordinary stores, pharmacies and medical supply stores to make nitromethane, PETN, blasting caps and shaped charges for use in destroying buildings. At present, it is estimated that at least 12 Middle Eastern and Asian terrorist groups are prepared to conduct suicide operations. Terrorists have also demonstrated an interest in non-conventional weapons. Chechen rebels planted a radiological bomb of caesium-137 in a Moscow park in 1995 and Chechen rebels have stolen radioactive metals such as plutonium, caesium, strontium and low-enriched uranium from nuclear power stations.
*Learn all about radiological weapons at aspitactical.com.
The Federation of American Scientists warned that a typical scenario for a radiological bomb is the detonation of a device of 500 grams of TNT combined with an americium-241 source used in surveying equipment. This device would contaminate a 2 km strip and an area of around 60 city blocks with 15 rem of radiation. Apart from death, injury and radiation sickness in those nearest the explosion, the cancer risk is assessed at one death in 10,000 individuals in the entire affected area. The entire area would have to be decontaminated which could take months or possibly years Decontamination and/or demolition of buildings and reconstruction in an area of high economic significance such as Manhattan or the City of London could cost US $50 billion. Toronto could count on proportional costs.
What notable attacks are publicly known to have been planned or carried out to date on critical infrastructure targets? Terrorist groups of all types have targeted critical infrastructure in the past and are likely to do so again.
Energy
Al Qaeda makes no secret of its interest in attacking the West’s oil supplies and has done everything from attack facilities in raids and suicide attacks to plotting to destroy whole refineries. Oil pipelines in Iraq have been attacked by militants with great frequency. This is not new terrorist thinking. Columbian rebels routinely attack pipelines. Despite heavy and constant
guarding, the Cano Limon 490-mile pipeline was attacked 70 times in 2002 by revolutionary forces opposed to the Colombian government, resulting in its shutdown for 266 days out of the year. In the previous year, it was shutdown 170 times as a result of revolutionary acion. Electrical relay systems, hydropower plants and power lines have been disabled by Maoist rebels in Nepal. An attempt by Palestinians to blow up Israel’s main fuel depot at Pi Glilot in Tel Aviv could have killed thousands. On September 11, 2001, hours after the World Trade Center attacks, the Bush administration tried to have the U.S. Coast Guard close Boston harbour, fearing a possible attack on Tanker ships.
The French super tanker Limburg was attacked near Yemen Harbour the following year. There have been many alleged Al Qaeda plots to blow up Saudi oil terminals and pipelines. The U.S. is reportedly increasingly worried about the vulnerability of its energy infrastructure, which is practically impossible to protect from terrorist attack – the Alyeska pipeline in Alaska has been attacked several times by locals though not by terrorists. Natural gas pipelines have reportedly been attacked in Seattle by Earth Liberation Front members. Recently, Al Qaeda mentioned pipelines and oil infrastructure in Canada that supply the “Great Satan” as likely targets.
Communications and Information Technology
Cyber attacks using computer viruses that crash vital systems can cause massive disruptions to financial and other vital systems. Noting the IT capabilities of Islamic terror groups, U.S. officials now admit that they underestimated the time Al Qaeda had spent mapping vulnerabilities. American authorities have reportedly detected operatives using telecom switches in several countries, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, to explore digital systems that control U.S. nuclear power plants, emergency telephone services, and water storage and distribution.
A computer seized from an Al Qaeda safe house in Kabul contained an engineering program used to locate stress weaknesses in buildings, bridges and dams.
The greatest threat to communications and information technology comes from devices that jam electrical and elec-tronic systems by generating an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). When detonated, an EMP weapon produces massive current and voltage surges that create a powerful electromagnetic field capable of short-circuiting computers, satellites, radios, military radar equipment and civilian traffic lights. Chaos ensues.
Finance
Terrorists have also shown an interest in Western financial institutions. In November of 2003, a series of attacks in Istanbul were blamed on Al Qaeda when two suicide bombers attacked the British consulate and the headquarters of HSBC bank, killing 61 people, including the British Consul General, and wounding at least 450. The first pickup truck exploded outside the Turkish headquarters of HSBC. The second, disguised as a food delivery truck, with explosives hidden in metal food containers, crashed the gate of the British Consulate. The bomb demolished two buildings at the entrance of the consulate compound. The bombings were near-simultaneous in timing and used fertiliser-based explosives.
Food
The FBI issued warnings in the recent past on the possible terrorist use of poisons in the food chain. Intelligence from the Iraqi war revealed that terrorist groups have been active in chemical and biological warfare studies. This has had a significant impact on security measures both in the U.K. and U.S. A follow-up classified intelligence bulletin, to state and local lawenforcement agencies, advised them to be vigilant for terrorists making ricin and botulism. The document was prompted by the discovery of home-made toxins in a radical Islamic compound in northeast Iraq that had been raided by Kurdish and U.S. troops.
The FBI also warned law enforcement officials to be aware of signs of toxin production such as large caches of yeast or infant formula, which can be used to grow or dilute biological toxins, and castor beans through which ricin is extracted. The Bureau also warned that terrorists could launch an attack against crops or livestock without sophisticated equipment or expertise.
For example, the 2001 outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease in the UK cost between $6-30 billion, with over four million animals destroyed.
Water
Documents discovered in Afghanistan indicated that Al Qaeda terrorists had been investigating ways to disrupt the U.S. water supply. Rather than poisoning or contaminating the water supply, threats primarily stem from conventional attacks on facilities to cyber assaults on their control systems, leaving large segments of the population without service.
Most reservoirs hold between three million and 30 million gallons of water, which would significantly dilute any poison – terrorists would have to release enormous quantities to do serious damage. Chlorinated water supplies kill most bacteria, and filtration systems remove
particles larger than one micron, thereby eliminating threats from anthrax and botulinum spores. It is more effective to poison a specific building and, even then, the volume of water already going through the system would likely dilute whatever was introduced. This is not to say that poisoning and contamination could not happen, but, they are more complex and therefore less likely to be used than a physical attack.
In February 2002, four Moroccans attempted to put cyanide into the water supply of the U.S. embassy in Rome. They were found with maps of the city and four kilograms of a powdered substance that contained cyanide. Later that year, Singapore officials uncovered a plot to contaminate the water supply when police found specific reconnaissance photographs and annotated street maps. Jemaah Islamiah, a group that has been linked to Al Qaeda, was planning to destroy water-supply pipelines to the strategic Changi Airport.
Transportation
The subway systems of Paris, Moscow, Berlin, Tokyo and now London have all been targets of terrorist attacks. Since 2001, terrorist plots have been foiled against the subway systems of New York, Singapore, Paris and also in London. In the past, diverse attack methods have been used against the metro subway environment, ranging from devices left behind and suicide bombings, to chemical weapons.
However, it appears that improvised explosive devices (IEDs), whether timed, remotely-detonated, or activated by a suicide attacker, have been the most prevalent. The Al Qaeda network, Chechen groups and Algerian Salafi Jihadist groups, Aum Shinrikyo cult and Irish republican terrorists, have all targeted subway networks in the past.
The Moscow metro suicide bombings on 6 February 2004 killed 39 people and injured 134 at the height of morning rush hour. In a series of attacks on March 11, 2004, bombs on Madrid commuter trains killed 191 people, defeated a government, and saw Spain withdraw its troops from Iraq. Little more than one year later, the July 7, 2005 Al Qaeda affiliated homegrown suicide bombings in London killed 52 people.
The Aum Shinrikyo (Supreme Truth) cult, famous for the sarin nerve agent attack on the Tokyo subway, demonstrated hydrogen cyanide’s limitations as a terrorist weapon, killing 12 people on 20 March 1995. Jihadists have long attempted to develop cyanide-based weapons. Public concern about this issue heightened in late 2001, following the discovery in Afghanistan of videos reportedly showing the testing of hydrogen cyanide gas on dogs. This, along with the knowledge that some Al Qaeda recruits had received training in chemical weapons production, gave rise to the view that the global jihad had developed a credible weapon of mass destruction capability.
Terrorists have shown interest in attacking maritime transportation systems. In January 2004, the Philippines’ Superferry 14 was attacked by Abu Sayyaf firebombs in Manila Bay, killing 116 people. In August 2005, another ferry was bombed, injuring 30 people. That same month, Turkish authorities thwarted an Al Qaeda plot to attack cruise ships in international waters, and Al Qaeda fired timer-controlled rockets at U.S. naval vessels in port in Aqaba. Recently, the Sri Lankan Navy defeated a Tamil Sea Tiger mass attack on Columbo harbour in Sri Lanka.
Safety
Since 2001, several targets have been mentioned in the landmark category such as the Sears Tower, Brooklyn and Golden Gate Bridges, New York Tunnels, Statue of Liberty, and Eiffel Tower, to name but a few. Methods of attack have ranged from raids, to suicide bombings, to an airliner attack and even an attack by a radiological weapon (dirty bomb). Remember, in 1995, Chechen rebels planted a radiological bomb in a Moscow park, and have stolen radioactive metals from nuclear power stations. Worrisome enough having such materials on the market?
Government
The September 11, 2001 the attack on the U.S. Pentagon, and the alleged Al Qaeda plan to go after the U.S. Capital that same day, are clear examples of how militants have plotted decapitation strikes not seen since the Cold War. Keep in mind that in the early 1990s Ramzi Youssef plotted an airliner attack on the CIA headquarters at Langley, and in 1993 an Al Qaeda affiliate plotted a suicide bomb attack on the UN Headquarters. Islamic militants are believed to have been responsible for the bomb attack on the Jammu Kashmir State legislature in October 2001 and the Indian Parliament in December 2001.
In April 2004, Jordan announced it had foiled a terrorist plot led by Zarqawi. Jordanian authorities said the suspects had plotted to use chemicals and explosives to blow up vital institutions, including Jordan’s intelligence department, the prime minister’s office, the U.S. embassy in Jordan and other sites, in an attack that would also have killed thousands of people in and around the capital. Unfortunately, Canada is not immune to terror plots – in June 2006, a Canadian plot was busted that is alleged to have included a gun raid on Parliament Hill and truck bombs of ammonium nitrate.
Conclusion
Never has the protection of critical infrastructure Never has the protection of critical infrastructure been as important as it is now – with the possible exception of the darkest days of the Cold War. Given the dedicated terrorist threat and the weapons and tactics at their disposal, it is amazing that Canada still lags so far behind on this critical issue. Other than defining critical infrastructure, setting up an office, and perhaps compiling a target list, Canada has done virtually nothing to protect its critical infrastructure.
We are still waiting on a planning document that is long overdue – we are apparently at draft 16, and counting! The only visible steps have been closing the road under NDHQ and barriers around the American and British Embassies. This flies in the face of the fact that Canada is high on the Al Qaeda target list and has yet to be attacked. This inaction is made more grave by Al Qaeda’s threat to attack Canada’s vulnerable petroleum industry. Let me see. We know they want to, we know they can, they have told us so. Yet, much like pre-Air India, we continue to make light of the possibility here at home. Let us hope that the government gets its act together soon on this important file.
Professor Joe Varner is the Chairman of the National Security Committee of the Federation of Military and United Services Institutes of Canada. He is also the Academic Program Manager for Homeland Security at the American Military University.
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