A soldier of the International Security Assistance Force walks past a cannabis field that Taliban militants used for cover in the Kandahar province.(Credit: Robert Bronwen, AFP Getty Images)

By Jenni Hesterman

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) recently released its 2008 Opium Winter Rapid Assessment Survey, which shows that Afghanistan not only provides 90% of the world’s supply of opium, but is now also the top supplier of cannabis, the source of marijuana and hashish. Approximately 70,000 hectares (173 acres) of the crop were cultivated in 2007, as compared to 50,000 hectares in 2006. Estimates show yet another increase in production in 2008. The UNODC Executive Director Antonio Maria Costa summed up the challenge by stating: “Thus, today, Afghanistan has become the world's biggest supplier of two drugs: the most deadly one (heroin), and the one most commonly used (cannabis)”.

With unwanted Taliban (and world) attention on poppy production, farmers are increasing their cannabis plantings. According to the UN, nearly three quarters of the farmers in the southern Kandahar province will plant cannabis this spring. Despite the fact that cannabis crop is less lucrative than poppies, cannabis farmers make $30 per day, which is five times as much as harvesting wheat. Cannabis is easier and less expensive to grow, and there is increasing demand by users in neighboring countries. Although both drugs are banned by Islam, cannabis appears to be more acceptable than opium. It is converted into “cigarette-tees”, which are widely available for purchase in local markets throughout the region.

The escalating cannabis crop in Afghanistan has several implications. The overall U.S. commitment to counternarcotics in Afghanistan is about $500 million a year, and although a portion of the funds go toward hindering narco-trafficking, the bulk is spent on poppy eradication efforts. In fact, the 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, released by the State Department, does discuss hashish seizures by officials, yet doesn’t mention cannabis crop production in Afghanistan as a focus area. Addressing this issue on the ground will likely require additional money and manpower, or the diversion of resources from the poppy suppression efforts.

At the tactical level, Taliban fighters have been known to hide in the marijuana fields. Plants can grow up to 10 feet and provide a thick, dense cover not easily penetrated by thermal devices. Cannabis foliage is hearty and moist; as discovered in other eradication efforts, it does not burn easily. Once ignited, the resulting smoke has an ill effect on humans and animals in the vicinity, thus impacting those beyond the area of operations.

Finally, the increased cannabis production could affect many innocent civilians. Established drug trading routes in the region are expected to burgeon, and villages along the routes have been warned by officials to expect increasing activity by traffickers, law enforcement, and possibly the Taliban.

About the Author
Jenni Hesterman is a retired Air Force colonel and counterterrorism specialist. She is a senior analyst for The MASY Group, a Global Intelligence and Risk Management firm that supports both the U.S. Government and leading corporations. She is also an adjunct professor at American Military University, teaching courses in homeland security and intelligence studies.

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The risk for terrorist attack is plotted using data from the study. Red identifies urban areas of highest risk, yellow is medium risk, and green is lowest risk. (Credit: Walter W. Piegorsch)

By Jenni Hesterman

A leading statistician and environmental risk expert has published a landmark report that rates 132 U.S. cities on their vulnerability to terrorist attack using a newly-developed statistical method. In the study, entitled “Benchmark Analysis for Quantifying Urban Vulnerability to Terrorist Incidents”, Dr. Walter W. Piegorsch, a professor at the University of Arizona, calculated the susceptibility of urban areas to attack by assessing socio-economic factors, natural and environmental hazards, and the city’s infrastructure. Critical industries, ports, railroads, bridges, tunnels, water/sewage systems and the age and fragility of the existing infrastructure were also considerations. Demographics were evaluated, as a way to predict the impact of an attack on the populace, and to assess the likely response of residents.

Finally, the team analyzed and factored in historical data from the Terrorism Knowledge Base and the Global Terrorism Data Base. The research yielded over 1,000 unique terrorist-related incidents in the targeted cities, spanning a 30 year period.

The study, sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security, yielded some unanticipated results. For instance, Boise, Idaho was ranked 10th, primarily due to its position near a major dam and vulnerability for major forest fires. City officials acknowledged surprise at the rating, and initiated contact with both Piegorsch and the state’s Homeland Security officials for clarification on the study and its results.

The overall results show that the eastern and southern seaboards of the U.S. are at greatest risk, and also indicate a large swath of vulnerability from Texas to Ohio. The cities that scored highest overall were New Orleans, LA followed by Baton Rouge, LA; Charleston, SC; Norfolk, VA; the New York/Newark area; and Washington, D.C.

As with all studies, particularly those engaged in predictive analysis, some factors had greater weight than others. For instance, Piegorsch readily admits that "Nuclear power plants and military facilities did not come up as high risk in our analysis". Although this assessment runs contrary to many other studies and theories on potential terrorist targets, the study’s results are certainly worthy of further review and analysis. A follow on study could assess whether federal funding is going to the right cities for the right programs, to maximize resource allocation. Local authorities in the cities identified might use the results as a springboard to initiate specialized training, or augment their Critical Infrastructure Protection program. Business owners may want to reassess their insurance coverage; many large firms now offer specialized policies, such as AIG which recommends Property Terrorism Insurance to cover owners in the event of loss or damage due to terrorist attacks.

In the concluding paragraph of the study, the author states that the bottom line is that “place matters”. But Piegorsch wants the public to remember that the report doesn't try to predict where terrorists might attack. "It's not probability of being a target," he said. "It's vulnerability."

Jenni Hesterman is a retired Air Force colonel and counterterrorism specialist. She is a senior analyst for The MASY Group, a Global Intelligence and Risk Management firm that supports both the U.S. Government and leading corporations. She is also an adjunct professor at American Military University, teaching courses in homeland security and intelligence studies.

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According to The Washington Post, a U.S. Justice Department information-sharing system called the National Data Exchange (N-DEx) is nearly complete.

Check out the full story.

The data system, which law enforcement authorities hope will become a "one-stop shop" for information, will be accessible to the federal-law enforcement agencies like the FBI, and state fusion centers.

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By Jenni Hesterman

The State Department recently issued its latest International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, detailing activities of countries involved in the drug trade and outlining U.S. policy and activity in the fight against the manufacturing and distribution of illegal narcotics. Released by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, the report includes a new section entitled "Mobile Payments--A Growing Threat", which outlines the ways technology may be exploited by nefarious groups to obscurely launder, move and store cash. Mobile payments, also known as “m-payments”, “proximity payments”, or “micropayments”, are point-of-sale cash transactions made through a mobile device such as cell phone or personal data assistant. The sender takes the cash to a remittance center, which charges a modest service fee. The center then “sends” the amount to the recipient’s mobile account, also known as an e-wallet or e-purse. The recipient gets a text message on the mobile device indicating the sum has been placed in the account. The cash can then be collected at any participating remittance center, retail store, or, if business evolves as predicted, fast food outlet. The entire transaction takes mere minutes. Furthermore, use of a “throw-away” cell, phone purchased with cash, makes the transfer even more obscure and difficult to trace.

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body that works internationally to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. FATF has also shown concern over emerging telecommunications technology as related to licit financial transactions made outside the regulated banking sector. FATF calls them “new payment methods” or NPMs. NPMs are also referred to in the industry as “e-money”, “digital cash” or “e-cash”. Examples of NPMs include the following: Internet payment services; prepaid calling, retail and credit cards; digital precious metals; and the aforementioned m-payments.

Through internet payment services, money can be moved between accounts, and the balance can then be liquidated into an untraceable card used to withdraw cash from ATMs worldwide. Phone cards, retail cards and credit cards may now be purchased with cash at many stores. The owner of the cards remains anonymous, an unlimited number of small value cards may be purchased and held, and any subsequent use is virtually untraceable. Finally, the emerging commodity of digital precious metals is a way to store and move large amounts of cash. Through this service, users create an account requiring little personal information and then secure cash deposits against gold, silver and platinum held in “off shores” via the Internet.

Traditional money laundering makes “dirty” money “clean” after the crime was committed, and the money trail is usually quite easy to follow. Terrorists launder "clean" money by moving and storing it for the purposes of financing training and future operations. The lack of physical evidence in mobile transactions, and the ability to easily move and store money through various NPMs, should be of great concern to the law enforcement community.

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