By Irvin Varkonyi
Originally published in NDTA Defense Transportation Journal, April 2009

The Value of Human Capital

The nation has met the harsh challenges of protecting our national security, weakened by the tragedies of terrorism, natural disasters and low priorities of infrastructure protection, with an immense response at all levels of Government and the commercial sector. This response called on its citizens, whether they are the President of the United States, a night watchman at a semi-conductor factory or a university professor of supply chain management to not only exert maximum effort to protect each other but to recognize the value of human capital to detect, plan for, mitigate, respond and recover from disasters. Such action can make the difference in protecting our Defense Industrial Base, the loss of which, or severe weakening, would compound our weakness in maintaining national security.

Educating and training Human Capital will be the responsibility of the enterprises who employ us; of the universities who teach us rational reasoning and acquisition of knowledge; of professional associations such as the National Defense Transportation Association through their educational activities; and most importantly each of us to learn and continuously improve our knowledge in a rapidly changing world.

DHS' Critical Manufacturing Sector Specific Agency

Among recent developments at the Dept of Homeland Security in support of protecting critical infrastructure has been the formation of the Critical Manufacturing Sector Specific Agency (SSA). This SSA joined sixteen other SSA's including the Defense Industrial Base Critical Sector. The two SSA's are obviously interrelated as the security of the nation depends on our ability to produce the goods to support warfighters, Federal, state and local homeland security, and the commercial sector to sustain itself.

It is undeniable that the loss of key manufacturers in industries such as transportation equipment, automotive, electricals, primary metals and more will severely impact the security of the nation. How well do stakeholders understand these relationships? More important, how do stakeholders learn to collaborate to be Secure, Resilient and Prepared? The answer lies clearly in the ability to train, educate and motivate human capital.

Please pass on your experiences with institutions, organizations and universities who accept the value of human capital as the bulwark to protect the nation.

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Irvin Varkonyi currently teaches courses in Transportation and Logistics Management as an adjunct professor at American Military University.

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By Jenni Hesterman

Speculation of his death in a January, 2008 Predator strike in Waziristan has now been inarguably refuted: Adam Gadahn is alive and talking in his new 40 minute video entitled "Let's Continue our Jihad and Sacrifice."

He's been riding the FBI's Most Wanted Terrorist List for year, following indictment in the Central District of California for treason and material support to al Qaeda. The charges are related to Gadahn's alleged involvement in a number of terrorist activities, including providing aid, comfort and services to al Qaeda. The State Department's Rewards for Justice Program is offering up to $1 million for information leading to his arrest.

His latest video accuses President Obama of "standing behind the killing of Muslims in Palestine, Afghanistan and Pakistan", and speaks directly to the citizens of Gaza and Pakistan asking them to "unsheathe the swords of Jihad and arise". The NEFA foundation has posted a full copy of the transcript.

Adam Yahiye Gadahn was born in Oregon as Adam Perlman on September 1, 1978. His paternal grandfather was a prominent member of the Jewish community. At some point, Gadahn's father turned away from the Jewish faith, embracing Christianity, and the family changed their last name from Perlman to Gadahn (after the biblical warrior "Gideon"). Gadahn was raised and homeschooled on an isolated farm in Southern California, yet he became a fan of "Death Metal" music and even started his own heavy metal band. In 1994, worried about the negative influence of his friends, his parents sent him away, at age of 16, to live with his grandparents in Florida.

A year later, Gadahn became a vivid internet surfer. Always curious about religions, he accessed information on the Internet about the Islamic religion; he then became involved with a local group and eventually converted. He posted an essay to a University of Southern California website entitled "Becoming a Muslim" where he discusses his Jewish and Christian background and why he wanted to convert. In 1998, he moved to Pakistan and married an Afghan refugee.

It is not known exactly how he came to become involved with al Qaeda, where he is known as "Azzam the American"or "Azzam al-Amriki". It is known that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed recruited Gadahn for an AQ suicide attack in Maryland in 2003, but Gadahn's wife had just delivered his child, so he begged out of the operation. In 2005, the FBI warned that Gadahn was part of a group of 7 al Qaeda operatives planning an attack in the U.S. In the intervening years, Gadahn has been part of many al Qaeda videos, as either spokesperson or producer, and he worked with Osama bin Laden on his Oct 2007 video.

An al Qaeda video released last month featured Gadahn speaking (in American English) to several recruits, explaining life in the organization. The video was thought to target American youth. The date of Gadahn's talk couldn't exactly be determined, therefore speculation remained about his death. That speculation ended this week with the release of his video.

"Azzam the American" is once again hiding in plain sight.

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About the Author Jenni Hesterman is a retired Air Force colonel and counterterrorism expert. She is a senior analyst for The MASY Group, a Global Intelligence and Risk Management firm that supports both the U.S. Government and leading corporations. She is also an adjunct professor at American Military University, teaching courses in homeland security and intelligence studies and is a contributing editor for The Counter Terrorist Magazine. You may contact the author at JLHBlog@aol.com.

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With hopes to provide an "inside-out view" of what is done every day in the world of homeland security, the DHS launched a new site The Blog @Homeland Security.

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By Miller J. Wilson

William J. Daugherty makes some good points in his paper but I would have to disagree with him. The review process for covert actions fails on many levels and for many reasons. Some of these reasons include the sheer number of people who are briefed about actions, the lack of punitive actions against Congressmen/women who leak information, and the belief that somehow it is impossible that an action could not be taken without a Presidential Finding or Congressional approval. I shall discuss each point and why it causes the review process to fail below.

Let us start by discussing the first problem which is the sheer number of people who have knowledge of a covert action. As Daugherty states, "the total number of witting persons on Capitol Hill was no longer small, for selected committee staff were also read into the programs." (Daugherty 2004 P.64) This increase of the number of people who have knowledge about a cover action 1) takes away any form of "plausible deniability", which is one of the reasons for a covert action, if it is discovered and 2) increases the chances of the covert action being discovered either by accidental or intentional leaks, which is counter to the idea of covertness. The commonly understood definition of "covert" is to be secret or secretive. Common sense tells us that the more people who have knowledge about something the less secret it is and so by increasing the number of people who are briefed by a covert action the less covert it becomes.
The next problem of the review process for covert actions is the lack of punitive actions against Congressmen/women who leak information. This is evidenced by Daugherty when he states, "And finally, a less-than-respectable but just as effective ''last resort veto'' could be achieved simply by leaking the existence of the Finding to the press," as there is currently no law that prevents or punishes members of Congress who chose to go this route despite the fact that doing so can and does put allies, whether other states or individuals, in danger as evidenced by the threats or terrorists against nations which housed "US Secret Prisons" after that information was leaked. (Daugherty 2004 P.65)
Finally, Daugherty believes so strongly that "rogue actions" are impossible that he devotes an entire section explaining why they are impossible. (Daugherty 2004 P76) Not only does this belief remove any form of "plausible deniability", one of the main reasons for covert actions, but it ignores the reality that they have happened even with the review process as evidenced by the Iran-Contra affair and the "Enhanced Interrogations" controversy (if we are to believe Congressional Leaders who deny about having knowledge or being briefed about both.) It seems highly unlikely that an intelligence agency, which trains personnel to set up shell companies and hide involvement in activities, would be unable to set up shell companies or siphon funds from one project to pay for another project undetected when the same tactics are successfully employed everyday by private sector companies and criminal organizations. Again I must point to the Iran-Contra affair as evidence that this has happened in the past.
Though there are other problems with the review process these three are the most prominent which prevent it from being effective. The large number of people given knowledge of covert actions increases the chance of leaks and removes "plausible deniability", both of which are key components to covert actions. The ability of Members of Congress to leak information for personal or political reasons without any punitive action also puts all covert actions at risk and puts our allies in danger. Finally the review process is merely a façade that allows Members of Congress to believe that they have authority and control of covert actions even though this control is limited by the professionalism and willingness of the IC to be open, honest, and willing participants. The reality of the review process is that Members of Congress use it as a political tool to either embarrass opponents or use as leverage for their political gain while failing to see that the IC has the ability and resources to simply disregard it at anytime of their choosing even if this is unlikely.

Resources:
Daugherty, William J. 2004. Approval and Review of Covert Action Since Reagan. International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Tailor & Francis Group. Internet. Hosted by American Military University. [accessed: 06/03/09].

Pelosi Briefed in 2002 About Enhanced Interrogation Methods, accessed 06/07/2009

Miller J. Wilson is currently an AMU student working on his BA in Intelligence Operations. In addition he is a volunteer for his local Medical Reserve Corps and Citizens Emergency Response Team (CERT).

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