Newsfeed Options

News Headlines

« June 2009 | Main | August 2009 »

July 28, 2009 - 15:36

America's New Nightmare

Newsweek profiles, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban's second in command. Ron Moreau writes:

"In all likelihood, you've never heard of Mullah Baradar. The only Taliban leader most people know is Mullah Mohammed Omar, the unworldly, one-eyed village preacher who held the grand title amir-ul-momineen--"leader of the faithful"--when he ruled Afghanistan in the late 1990s. Omar remains a high-value target, with a $10 million U.S. bounty on his head. But he hasn't been seen in at least three years, even by his most loyal followers, and rarely issues direct orders anymore. In his place, the adversary that American forces are squaring off against in Afghanistan--the man ultimately responsible for the spike in casualties that has made July the deadliest month for Coalition soldiers since the war began in 2001--is Baradar. A cunning, little-known figure, he may be more dangerous than Omar ever was."

Read entire article.

July 27, 2009 - 11:57

Why Aren't We Taxing Terrorism?

By Shelley Smith

Historically in the United States, applying criminal tax laws to lethal organizations is not new and many had been brought down by United States Treasury agents. Today those same resources are being applied by American law enforcement against Al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups. Understanding terrorist financing enforcement through counter terrorism enforcement is fighting political violence through legal proceedings and the rule of law. Yet there is a pending question of, why aren't we taxing terrorism?

Since 1994, the United States has officially recognized the crime of terrorist financing through the enactment of, 18 U.S.C. ยง 2339A. Terrorist financing can involve dirty money and focuses in on the illegal source of funds that are connected to any illegal activity, such as charities as fronts for terrorist organizations, illegal drug trafficking and others. The current worldwide strategy against such activities is aimed at disrupting the ability of state sponsors of terrorism and sub-national terrorist organizations, yet the U.S. tax laws are structured in such a way to where illegal activities by terrorist organizations and groups can circumvent around the laws and continue their illegal activities.

In 2005, Jeffrey Breinholt, Senior Fellow and Director of National Security Law and the Deputy Chief of the Justice Department's Counterterrorism Section, brought to our attention a largely overlooked aspect of U.S. federal criminal law enforcement, the criminal tax law. His original study was published August 1, 2005, "Taxing Terrorism, From Al Capone to Al Qaida: Fighting Violence through Financial Regulation", has since been published into a book titled the same in 2007.

The efficacy of criminal tax prosecutions needs to go beyond cases of tax fraud and other tax crimes and also focus on the larger issue of how criminal tax tools fit into federal criminal law towards the illegal proceeds of crime that qualifies as income. There still remains the need for reformation in the structured wordings in several of the IRS forms such as the informational form 1099.

However, there has been a change in tax liability in the 2007 Form 1040 -ES, but no where in the U.S. Treasury Department's" Comprehensive Strategy for Reducing the Tax Gap", September 26, 2006, or in the "A Summary of the Dynamic Analysis of the Tax Reform Options", prepared by the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, May 25, 2006, was it mentioned about tightening controls on illegal assets, including the protection of charitable sectors from the risk of terrorist exploitation.



About the Author
Shelley Smith is an expert in analysis and research on a variety of topics and issues that include national and international security, homeland security, terrorism and counterterrorism, law enforcement, and criminal justice systems. Smith is currently pursuing an Master's in Intelligence Studies Capstone with a concentration in Middle Eastern Studies at AMU.

July 26, 2009 - 13:46

Specialized Interrogation Unit May Be Created

According to The Washington Post, a task force led by the Justice Department is exploring the idea of creating a small, specialized interrogation unit that will be used to question, without the use of coercion, any future high-value terrorism suspects captured by the United States.

The Obama administration has already banned the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques". The new unit will be going after "actionable intelligence" rather than information that could be used against the captured in criminal cases.

Read the entire article.

July 17, 2009 - 12:28

Ready.gov Launches Social Media Preparedness Initiative

The U.S. Department of Homeland Security's Ready Campaign, in partnership with The Advertising Council, is introducing a series of social media tools to further engage Americans in taking steps to prepare for emergencies. The initiative is an extension of Resolve to be Ready in 2009, a nationwide effort designed to encourage individuals, families, businesses and communities to take action and prepare for emergencies in 2009.

Homeland Security Dept. Looking for Cybersecurity Solutions

According to The Blog @Homeland Security, the Department of Homeland Security is looking for "products that could be used for its integrated cybersecurity program that includes software and hardware."

Those interested in the opportunity need to contact the department by July 22.

July 7, 2009 - 09:04

Scenario for a North Korean Nuclear Assault

By Miller J. Wilson

With North Korea admitting to weaponizing nuclear materials, continuing to perform missile tests, and threatening nuclear war if their ships are searched, the US is in a difficult position. Both Japan and South Korea are obvious targets for an attack and with US forces spread thin it would be nearly impossible to use US forces to defend either nation without pulling troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq to fight in Korea.

To compound the problem even more we don't even know what North Korea will do or if it will do anything. Figuring this out becomes even more difficult when we take into account the differences in the psychology of the North Korean and US cultures and their leaders. Despite these problems it is essential that we try to anticipate what actions North Korea might take even if we can only base it off of what we might do in the same situation. It is to this end that I present what I would do in this situation.

If I were the leader of North Korea and decided to take military action I would do a simultaneous two prong attack using a nuclear strike on Japan targeting Tokyo, Kyoto, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima. At the same time I would engage in strikes against South Korea using conventional missiles on Seoul while invading with ground forces. Each of these strikes has their purpose with the targets chosen for their symbolic and military value. I shall explain my choice of targets as well as why a dual assault would be used even if it meant having a war on two fronts.

Despite the tensions between North Korea and Japan a nuclear assault on Japan has other strategic values. The main value is that the US would use Japan as a staging area for air assaults on North Korea as it did during the Korean conflict. By using a nuclear attack on Japan this would show that US air bases would not be safe and so a new location would have to be chosen.

Second, an attack on Japan would garner support from both China and Russia who already limit the sanctions against North Korea in the UN. So why would China and Russia support an attack on Japan? Currently Russia and Japan are in a territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands with both claiming ownership. If Japan was attacked it would be in no position to continue the dispute and Russia could finally take full claim of the Kuril Islands.

China on the other hand suffered many atrocities by Japan during WWII and the Chinese people would see it as just punishment done in proxy by North Korea. So why would I choose to use a nuclear strike on Tokyo, Kyoto, Nagasaki, and Hiroshima? For the symbolic and psychological impact as well as preventing US arguments. Tokyo is an obvious target because it is the capital of Japan and a strike there would disrupt government and delay any military action. Kyoto on the other hand is chosen for its symbolism as it was once the Imperial Capital of Japan. A nuclear strike here is a direct attack on the cultural heritage of the Japanese people and its destruction would cause severe damage to the Japanese psyche.

Finally, Nagasaki and Hiroshima are chosen because the US dropped nuclear bombs and so the US would be in a very compromising situation arguing in the UN for actions against North Korea for doing the same thing it did. Also the citizens of both these cities were either victims of the US nuclear attack or are the children and grandchildren of victims and so a second attack would be psychologically devastating. If North Korea then followed these attacks immediately by stating they were because of US presence in Japan there would be a tremendous amount of pressure to expel US forces and a rise in anti-US sentiment preventing Japan being used as a second front.

So why use a nuclear attack on Japan and not South Korea? There are a couple of reasons for not using a nuclear attack on South Korea. First is the surprise factor on Japan. By launching missiles at Seoul and Japan at the same time the first thought is going to be that they a nuclear and preparations will be made for that which would minimize the damage dealt. However the missiles aimed at Seoul would reach first and if it they only contained conventional warheads it would give the impression that North Korea still did not have nuclear capabilities and that the missiles headed for Japan would be conventional instead of nuclear and so their guard would be let down and the nuclear attack would be more effective.

Once nuclear strikes on Japan were reported North Korea could then start the propaganda that they spared their Southern Brethren from a nuclear strike because they only wish to reunite Korea and not harm their brothers but if US forces were not expelled they would have no choice other than to use a nuclear strike. This would help increase anti-US sentiment as well as increase support for the South to join the North especially if it seemed that the US was unable or unwilling to help defend the South. So why would South Korean leaders surrender to the North? The simple fact is that the South is a military regime that wants to retain their power. Currently they are able to do so because they are backed by the US but they also recognize that there is a growing desire by the people in both the North and the South to reunite. If it appears that the US would be unable to help defend South Korea, either because forces are spread too thin or the US people are opposed to it, then North Korea could start making deals with the leaders to ensure their power in exchange for joining the North. The fear that the North might be victorious and punish those that opposed them would cause the military generals to change sides in droves.

So why attack Japan and South Korea at the same time? Other than the reasons stated already a dual assault has the advantages of causing confusion and forces the US to either spread their forces thin and making them weak or strengthening one area while abandoning another completely.

No matter what they choose it is a major blow to their prestige and will damage confidence in their ability to protect allies. This would have devastating effects world wide as forces in the Middle East would wonder if they can count on US forces or not while at the same time insurgents would get a morale boost and increase their attacks. In addition by attacking two allies of the US but not directly attacking the US directly the US population would be hard pressed to support direct military involvement of the US, especially if insurgent attacks against US troops in the Middle East increased.

So when would be the best time for North Korea to do this?

If it was me I would set my time table for September or October as this would give me some time to get missiles in place, make deals with military and government officials in the South, and stockpile nuclear material. But that is not the only reason for choosing this time frame. The second reason is that this is the start of the flu season in the Northern hemisphere and particularly the US and with the A/H1N1 pandemic level at stage 6. That combined with the fact that the A/H1N1 is following an almost identical pattern to the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic either the US and European population will be facing serious illness and death or their governments will be focusing their attention on the potential for that situation and not on North Korea.

So how do I see this situation happening? If I was leading North Korea I would be moving missiles into place, building my nuclear stockpile, and making deals with military and government leaders in the South as mentioned above. In addition if I was confident in my missile technology I would hold off on missile tests and use the guise of more tests for the actual attack. If, however, I was worried about the ability of my missiles to strike I would step up my missile tests until they were ready. Once ready I would conduct 2-3 more tests and intentionally have them horribly fail then stop altogether until September or October. Once September or October arrived I would announce another missile "test" but in fact actually launch the full scale assault on South Korea and the nuclear launch of Japan. The only thing that would alter this would be if the A/H1N1 virus became severe in the US early, then I would take advantage of the situation and do the assault early.



Miller J. Wilson is currently an AMU student working on his BA in Intelligence Operations. In addition he is a volunteer for his local Medical Reserve Corps and Citizens Emergency Response Team (CERT).