Rundown of CIA Director's Interview - Part 2
By William Tucker
In the continued analysis of CIA Chief Leon Panetta's remarks Sunday we will discuss two interrelated topics - the number of al-Qaeda left in Afghanistan and the slow progress being made in the Afghan counterinsurgency campaign. Before we dive into these topics we must address the US strategic outlook for Afghanistan. In the larger picture Afghanistan does not provide the US any true strategic prospects. Afghanistan is a mountainous landlocked nation that is poor in capital and does not have a good outlook on a central government. When the US decides it is time to withdraw Washington will begin to focus on counterterrorism operations designed to deny terrorists a safe haven in the area, but beyond this central Asia holds little interest for the US.
With this in mind we can see a desire for the US to withdraw. Unfortunately, the US wants to withdraw on terms that prevent the Taliban from becoming the dominate power in Afghanistan which may not be attainable on the President's time table. While the Taliban do not have the numbers that they enjoyed prior to the US invasion, they are strong enough to push the country back into a civil war. Of all the indigenous groups, no one has a true upper hand. The US needs a political settlement to take place among the central government, the Taliban, and the minority groups that once comprised the Northern Alliance. Without some political understanding the country will descend into chaos, thus allowing for the possibility of Afghanistan once again becoming a terrorist haven. As Panetta has said, the process is going slower than expected.
This leaves the remnants of al-Qaeda as a problem. The US realizes it cannot kill or capture every individual involved in al-Qaeda, but if Washington cannot destroy the terror group in its entirety it must make it inconsequential. Panetta's numbers of 50 to 100 al-Qaeda members may leave some of those that follow events in the Af-Pak Theater rather confused. It is likely that the numbers are taken from original members of al-Qaeda around the time of the 9/11 attacks that are still alive in the area, or this could be representative of foreign operatives in the area. Regardless, it is unlikely that this estimate includes the members of al-Qaeda's Shadow Army.
Using such a small estimate of al-Qaeda's size gives the US some room to maneuver. For domestic political reasons, and for reasons of international standing, Washington must show that the threat to the US from Afghanistan has been marginalized. By presenting al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as numbering under 100, the US can withdraw from major counterinsurgency operations and move to more targeted counterterrorism operations across South Asia without appearing to give up the fight. For the next year the US will continue counterinsurgency operations against the Taliban in an attempt to weaken the movement before the withdrawal occurs. In the long run the US has other, more pressing strategic concerns in the Middle East and Asia such as the continued Iranian nuclear program.



Comments
The key to winning a unconventional war dealing with terrorism or insurgency is human intelleingence(HUMINT). Undertsanding the culture,
the people, and how things really work in country is paramount in stopping acts of terrorism. Without good HUMINT, you don't have a chance of winning in Afhanistan or Iraq.
As a model, the United States should follow Israels lead on HUMINT and counter terrorism operations.
Posted by: Chris | June 29, 2010 5:28 AM